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AN INCONVENIENT SCHOOL OF THOUGHT 
F. Scott Kieff* 
Michael Carrier provides a helpful discussion of a range of issues that 
feature in current policy and academic debates about patents and innova-
tion, with particular focus on their interface with antitrust. He offers a 
great book about a great topic. And he does so through a well-written and 
thoughtful discussion of ideas put forth by himself and his intellectual 
friends. Yet, his work could have made a significantly greater impact if it 
had not kept from the reader a set of ideas from a different perspective: 
the school of thought that as a matter of historical fact motivated the 
choices by our elected officials from both political parties on several occa-
sions to specifically reject many of the ideas in the book.  
In the original blog posting version of this symposium, Carrier re-
sponded by noting: “[j]ust because a scholar does not appear in the book, 
however, does not mean that their work has not influenced me.”1 While 
Carrier is of course a generous and thoughtful person, who as a good aca-
demic and citizen of the world reads and listens to those having differing 
views, his response misses the point of the critique: the book would have 
greater impact if it revealed to readers the essence of these alternative 
views as well as the reasoning for considering them to be unpersuasive.  
Recognizing that every project could be improved in some ways and 
that ultimately the author must make the difficult choices between com-
pleteness and clarity, about his own voice and message, etc., I offer my 
comments on the chance that those who read Carrier’s great book might 
wonder whether there happens to have been or remain different approach-
es to the ideas he explores, whether our leaders ever considered those dif-
ferent views (in fact they did and found them persuasive in rejecting ideas 
like those he explores), and what are the main ways in which these diver-
gent schools of thought differ.  
  
 * Professor at George Washington University School of Law, and Senior Fellow at Stanford 
University’s Hoover Institution. This Work is part of the Hoover Property Rights Task Force and the 
Hoover Project on Commercializing Innovation, which studies the law, economics, and politics of 
innovation and which is available online at http://www.innovation.hoover.org. Correspondence may 
be sent to fskieff.91@alum.mit.edu. 
 1. Posting of Administrator on behalf of Michael Carrier to Truth on the Market, 
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/ (Apr. 1, 2009, 11:57 EST), available at 
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2009/04/01/professor-carriers-response/#more-1443. 
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As it turns out, the interface between patents and antitrust was one of 
the two central motivators behind the present U.S. patent statutes, which 
were codified as the 1952 Patent Act.2 In fact, one of the two principle 
drafters of the 1952 Act, Giles Rich, wrote a series of five articles in the 
1940’s that bear a title not unlikely to show up in a computer search on 
this topic. (The other principle drafter who also wrote a great deal about 
the statute was Pat Federico). And while the 1940’s were indeed a long 
time ago, because Giles Rich went on to be the longest sitting federal 
judge, the world’s most famous patent scholar and jurist, the widely rec-
ognized father of the modern American Patent System, and a judge on the 
court that hears most patent appeals, these papers were conveniently re-
published in a 2004–2005 volume of the Federal Circuit Bar Journal.3  
Judge Rich explored an approach that is focused on predictable validi-
ty and enforcement rules rather than the more flexible approaches advo-
cated by Carrier (and many others). Rich was not alone. His approach was 
followed in the writings of a diverse group of leading commercial jurists at 
the time like Learned Hand and Jerome Frank. (It is worth noting for rea-
sons explored below that if using modern political labels, Judge Frank 
would be seen as a liberal populist). 
The judiciary was not the only branch of government to follow Rich’s 
view. Rich provided extensive and explicit testimony before Congress 
about the goals of the ’52 Act in re-aligning the interface between patents 
and antitrust and in creating an objective standard for determining patent 
validity. Congress agreed with the approach he offered in his testimony 
when it voted for the statute. The Supreme Court in turn expressly and 
extensively relied on that legislative history, and especially Judge Rich’s 
testimony, in the well-known Dawson decision on patents and antitrust in 
1980.4 That approach was also affirmed by the current Supreme Court in 
Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink.5  
The bottom line is that while a core focus of Carrier’s book is the rela-
tion between patents and antitrust, the book leaves its reader entirely in the 
dark about the school of thought about that interface that actually moti-
vated Congress in passing the present patent system into law and that 
shaped the next half century of development in the case law. It is good that 
the book is not designed to recount history, because it would in that en-
deavor be writing out of the history the very events that were controlling. 
It also is good that the book is not designed to help the reader engage in a 
  
 2. F. Scott Kieff & Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, A Reemergence of Regulation at the Interface 
Between Patents and Antitrust?, 4 ENGAGE 97 (2003). 
 3. Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 5, 21, 37, 67, & 87 (2004–2005). (The other articles by Judge Rich that are republished in 
that volume also are instructive on the points explored in Carrier’s book). 
 4. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).  
 5. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
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fulsome intellectual enterprise, because it would fail in that endeavor as 
well by leaving the reader totally in the dark about a major school of 
thought in the field. The book’s success is in providing a nicely written 
and thoughtfully worded dissertation about the views of Carrier and his 
intellectual friends.  
The school of thought excluded by Carrier is not some oddball move-
ment from the political fringe or deep past. As Judge Pauline Newman has 
reminded on several occasions in law review articles and speeches, we can 
fast forward to the late 1970’s, when the economy was in difficult times 
like it was in the 1940’s and is today, to see that a very diverse pair of 
U.S. Presidents decided to also adopt an approach to patents like that 
urged by Rich, Federico, Hand, Frank, and others.6 President Carter de-
cided, after a careful study, to put forth a statute designed to strengthen 
the patent system by creating the Federal Circuit, and President Reagan 
signed the bill after Congress passed it.7 
Nor has this school of thought escaped the modern academic litera-
ture. For the past several years, there have been several academics writing 
about this approach to patents—an approach that might be seen as focused 
on the theory of property more generally (as compared with just intellec-
tual property). The group includes Richard Epstein, Steve Haber, Troy 
Paredes (now on leave from this academic work), Henry Smith, Joseph 
Straus, David Teece, Polk Wagner, Josh Wright, and me (these folks 
listed so far have collaborated on a range of recent works arising out of 
the Hoover Project on Commercializing Innovation), as well as Michael 
Abramowicz, John Duffy, Adam Mossoff, and others. While a recent 
posting on Patently-O labels one of these folks listed here (me) as “con-
servative,” it is not clear what is meant by that term.8 If the term is given 
its normal modern political meaning, then it is curious to note that Charles 
Burson, Al Gore’s former Chief of Staff, co-authored one of the recent 
opinion pieces I helped put together on patent reform, since it is not clear 
that he would fit that definition of the term. Then again, this is an ap-
proach also advocated by President Carter and Jerome Frank, who also 
don’t easily fit the modern political use of the term conservative. Put dif-
ferently, the issues don’t break down nicely along mainstream political 
lines. Nor do most people, for that matter. Nor do folks break down along 
  
 6. Judge Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 822–23 
(2005). 
 7. The relevant conclusions of the study can be found at ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION, INDUSTRIAL SUBCOMMITTEE FOR PATENT AND INFORMATION POLICY, REPORT ON 
PATENT POLICY 155 (1979). The statute that resulted is the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2006)). 
 8. Patently-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/ (Mar. 20, 2009, 12:33 EST), available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patently-o-bits-and-bytes-3.html. 
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lines of being propatent or antipatent. These issues are more complex. 
And so is any good academic.  
The most direct reason why it makes sense to go through all of this in-
tellectual history, naming all of these names of folks who have written 
about the topics Carrier explores (but in a fundamentally different way 
than he does), is that Carrier’s book does not seriously address any of 
them or their work. Indeed, Carrier has confirmed that his book doesn’t 
cite to or even mention most of these names or their work. And the few 
times when he does mention some of them, it is in a very minor way, for 
propositions that are uncontroversial and different from the potential areas 
of debate they would have with him. Two notable exceptions, which I 
appreciate, are Joseph Straus and me. Carrier mentions me once in a short 
catalog of different approaches to patent theory. And while he does men-
tion one or two of Straus’s pieces that have discussed a lack of evidence of 
a patent holdup problem in the European biotechnology setting, and Carri-
er seems to conclude in that section of his book that patents have posed 
less of a problem for basic science than some might have feared, he still 
ultimately concludes that “[a] few high-profile lawsuits against researchers 
would knock out the scaffolding currently supporting this precarious state 
of affairs.”9 
What is so precarious about this state of affairs, and why would a few 
lawsuits disrupt it? A few airlines crash once in a while and yet the airline 
sector still does business, and people who elect for safety reasons to drive 
over taking commercial flights are generally not seen as acting in a suffi-
ciently rational way to drive prudent policy on the issue. Rather than try-
ing to sit as a seemingly neutral judge weighing only the empirical evi-
dence and ideas Carrier elects to discuss in the book, a reader might want 
to know more about the reasons why patent holdup in this area is not a big 
issue (and why an “experimental” or “fair” use exception may be) and the 
book would have made a greater impact in this area if it had addressed 
more of that work.  
The bottom line is that while Carrier has good reasons for not engag-
ing the body of work discussed here, readers might like to at least know 
about the work, as well as the history, so that they can make up their own 
minds about these issues after due consideration of the range of views. For 
those who are interested, much of it is available for free download on the 
web at www.innovation.hoover.org.  
A more indirect reason why it matters to consider these other views is 
that many of them apply a form of comparative institutional analysis gen-
erally associated with the field of New Institutional Economics. In addition 
  
 9. MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 277–78 (2009). 
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to taking seriously the transaction cost problems of property rights that 
underlie a big part of Carrier’s analysis, this comparative approach also 
takes seriously the political economy problems that underlie how govern-
ment actors will apply different decision-making rules. Application of this 
comparative analytical framework highlights some of the complexities of 
the more flexible approaches Carrier recommends in his book.  
For example, when it comes to dealing with the problem of bad pa-
tents (and there are many such patents—ones that don’t really meet the 
requirements for validity but have nonetheless been issued by the PTO), 
Carrier endorses the currently-popular proposals for more flexible ap-
proaches to weeding out. These proposals generally go by several names 
including “second window,” “opposition,” “reexamination,” etc. In his 
words: “[a]n added bonus of the proposal would be its effect on antitrust. 
By providing a low-cost avenue to remove invalid patents, it would reduce 
the incidence of market power.”10 
But as economists love to say, there is no such thing as a free lunch. 
Faster and less financially expensive proceedings for policing bad patents 
are not without their costs. The way they go faster and burn fewer dollars 
per hour in attorney time is that they allow an official actor, whether in 
the PTO or the courts, the flexibility and discretion to deny patents based 
on a subjective report about what was within the skill of those in the prior 
art, rather than the objective and more fact-based inquiry into the contents 
and existence of actual laboratory notebooks, printed publications, and 
sample products which has been the rule since the 1952 Act.  
Flexibility sounds cool—who wants to be rigid?—but it has a signifi-
cant Achilles’ heel. Giving courts and examiners a pass from having to get 
the hard evidence that used to be required to prove invalidity over the 
prior art does not come without serious cost. Asking a decision maker to 
use her legal or technical expertise as the primary basis for her decision 
about what she thinks the state of the art was at a particular time in history 
gives her greater discretion than asking an ordinary jury whether a particu-
lar document or sample product existed at a particular time and what that 
document actually contains. By increasing the discretion of government 
bureaucrats, flexibility increases, not decreases, uncertainty, and it gives a 
built-in advantage to large companies with hefty lobbying and litigation 
budgets. That may be a big reason why some big firms want it, but what’s 
good for some big businesses is not always good for business overall. 
Indeed, while much is made about the uncertainty of patents—it is all 
the rage today—one of the central problems with many of the legal 
changes that Carrier proposes is that these changes inject into the patent 
system a much greater uncertainty, and an uncertainty of a much more 
  
 10. Id. at 229. 
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pernicious type. Business can deal well with factual uncertainty—in fact 
many forms of business thrive on it (think options, futures, insurance, 
etc.)—but the one type of uncertainty that is particularly bad for business 
overall is the uncertainty caused by having the underlying legal rules of 
the game enforced as a function of fashion and politics. But this is what 
you get when the enforcement mechanism (the details of the particular 
framework of the legal institutional design) is a matter of flexible discre-
tion.  
And to take things back to where they started, we have already run 
this experiment in this country. The relevant legal framework for adjudi-
cating patentability before the 1952 Act was that courts were asked to de-
termine whether a patented invention constituted an “invention.”11 A bit of 
a tautology. And very flexible.  
The drafters of the 1952 Act did not think that the words “obvious-
ness” and “nonobviousness” were any clearer, on their face.12 But they 
picked these words precisely because they wanted to jettison the interpre-
tive baggage associated with the old legal framework and create a new 
body of case law that focused on more objective factors.  
History can sometimes offer us some good ideas, as well as reasons 
for not pursuing others. And while we often like to emphasize the impor-
tance of invention, especially our own inventive ideas, our efforts to re-
invent legal thinking in an area with such a rich intellectual history as this 
one may not play out so well if it is kept so much in the dark about that 
history. Readers of Carrier’s book benefit greatly from his productive 
discussion of his interesting ideas. But readers would have benefited much 
more had the book revealed the alternative school of thought (and Carri-
er’s thinking about it) that happened to have played such an important role 
in the field’s history. 
  
 11. Kieff & Mossinghoff, supra note 2, at 97. 
 12. Id. 
